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This article analyzes a model of the policy decision process in ministerial gov-
ernments. A spending minister and a finance minister are involved in making a
decision concerning a public project. The two ministers have partially conflicting
preferences. Policydecisionsaremadeintwostages. Inthefirststagethespend-
ing minister consults a technical expert to obtain information about the technical
consequences of the project. If the technical consequences are favourable, in the
second stage the finance minister consults a financial expert to obtain information
about the financial consequences. The finance minister can veto a proposal for
undertaking the project. This article illustrates the consequences of specializa-
tion for information transmission. A drawback of specialization is that projects are
evaluated on the basis of their individual consequences rather than on the basis
of their total consequences.
1. Introduction
A common problem faced by political actors is the need to rely on information
provided by experts. In the last two decades, several authors have developed
modelsoftheinteractionbetweenpoliticalagentsandexperts. Usuallythestart-
ingpointisapolitician,whohastomakeapolicydecisionunderuncertainty. In
order to avoid a wrong decision the politician can consult an expert. The expert
is often referred to as a bureaucrat or a policy adviser. This literature typically
addresses two types of questions. First, to what extent does the interaction
between political agents and experts lead to an efﬁcient use of information?
And second, who has the greater inﬂuence on policy decisions, political agents
or experts? Without a doubt, the existing literature has contributed much to our
understanding of the policy formation process. Several authors have identiﬁed
the conditions under which experts’ recommendations are credible to political
agents(Calvert,1985; CrawfordandSobel,1982; LupiaandMcCubbins,1994,
1998; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; and Letterie and Swank, 1997). Moreover,
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several authors have shown how institutional features may constrain experts
to exploit their information advantage (see, e.g., Banks and Weingast, 1992;
Bawn, 1992; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen, 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast, 1987; and McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
The literature on the interaction between elected politicians and experts has
much to offer. However, in our view it pays too little attention to four common
features of the policy-making process. First, in most countries the government
is not a coherent entity (Tirole, 1994). Individual politicians are often not
supposed to maximize social welfare, but rather are to pursue a limited goal.
For example, the Minister of Environmental Affairs is expected to protect the
environment rather than to care about the interests of ﬁrms; the latter interests
are promoted by the Minister of Industry. Second, many policies have a host of
consequences, all being surrounded with uncertainty. Few experts, if any, have
expertise on all possible consequences. In general, experts are specialists who
owe their information advantage to paying extraordinary attention to a speciﬁc
area. A direct consequence of this kind of specialization is that to obtain
information about complex policies policymakers have to rely on many experts
(economists, sociologists, technicians, lawyers, etc.). Third, experts differ.
Facedwiththesamepolicyproblem,expertswillyielddifferentanswers. Thisis
mostclearlystatedinFuchsetal.(1998:1389),whofoundthatamongeconomic
experts “policy positions are usually more closely related to differences in
valuesthantodifferencesinestimatesofwhatwejudgetoberelevanteconomic
parameters.” Theimportanceofdifferencesinpolicyvaluesgoes,inourview,to
the heart of understanding the policy-making process. Indeed Fuchs (1996:15)
once stated that economists as policy advisers have been quite ineffective in
the U.S. health care reform debate because of their inability to make value
differences in the debate explicit. Fourth, politicians have the power to appoint
experts. Directly or indirectly they choose the experts they consult.
To improve our understanding of the policy formation process, this article
addresses these four features. We present a model of the policy formation
process that has the following characteristics. First, two political agents are
involved in making a decision about a public project. The ﬁrst political agent is
referredtoasthespendingministerandthesecondastheﬁnanceminister. These
two political agents have (partially) conﬂicting preferences. This characteristic
of the model reﬂects the fact that the government is not a homogeneous entity.
Theclashoverdepartmentalgoalsiswidelyrecordedasacharacteristicofmost
governments. For example, Heclo and Wildavsky (1984) show in great detail
how the British civil service is divided by two cultures: those representing
the spending departments versus those of the treasury. Former CEA chairman
Herbert Stein (1996:12) remembers numerous instances of clashes between the
CEA chairman and the secretary of the treasury. Second, the project has two
types of consequences which are both uncertain. The two political agents have
incomplete information about both types of consequences of the project. There
are two types of experts: experts who know the ﬁrst type of consequences,
and experts who know the second type of consequences. This characteristic of
the model reﬂects specialization. Third, political agents appoint their experts.604 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V15 N3
Whenhiringbureaucratsorexperts,theylookattheapplicants’preferencesover
policies. The spending minister is assumed to appoint a “technical” expert,
and the minister of ﬁnance is assumed to appoint an expert who is able to
assess the ﬁnancial consequences of policies. Fourth, communication between
advisers and political actors is imprecise. Experts are unable to explain the
exact consequences of policies. Rather, they can only advise the politicians to
undertake a project or to maintain the status quo. Though this assumption is
restrictive, it has some appeal in that in the real world politicians often lack the
time to examine the host of reports produced by experts. Moreover, in many
casesonemaywonderwhetherpoliticiansfullyunderstandthetechnicaldetails
ofpolicyreports. Thisfeatureofthemodelmeansthatreportsofexpertscanbe
interpreted as policy recommendations. As such, the reports are “cheap talk”
(Austin-Smith, 1993).
Oneinterpretationofourmodelisthatitdescribesthepolicydecision-making
process in ministerial governments. In these governments individual ministers
are responsible for the policy areas that fall under their jurisdiction. As the
head of the department, each minister has appointment power: he can choose
the people assisting him. An important feature of the bureaucracy in min-
isterial governments is “its fragmentation according to speciﬁc policy areas”
(AndewegandBakema,1994). Inministerialgovernments,thepowerofspend-
ing ministers is usually constrained by the minister of ﬁnance. The power of
the minister of ﬁnance varies across countries. In Germany, for example, the
minister of ﬁnance has the power to veto all proposals with ﬁnancial conse-
quences (M¨ uller-Rommel, 1994). In other countries, the minister of ﬁnance
has less formal power. Yet spending ministers often identify the minister of
ﬁnance as a major constraint on their capacity to advance new policy proposals
(see, e.g., Farrell, 1994; King, 1994).
An alternative interpretation of the model is that it describes the informa-
tion transmission from informed to less informed agents in direct legislative
elections.1 Intheseelectionsvoterschoosebetweenspeciﬁcpolicyalternatives.
In general, ordinary voters are less informed about the consequences of initia-
tives than the agents submitting them. However, voters may infer information
from what they know about the proposer’s preferences. Moreover, uninformed
voters can acquire information about proposals by emulating the behavior of
well-informed voters (see Lupia, 1994). Obviously the amount of information
transmitted depends heavily on the credibility of the informed voters.
In this article we try to explain the behavior of political actors and advisers
in a political system that is characterized by division of tasks and asymmetric
information. We address questions like: Who are the experts assisting po-
litical actors? Why do political actors attend to sources that share their own
predispositions? Do political actors or their experts make public decisions?
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model. In
Section 3, we analyze the equilibria of the game. Section 4 discusses the role
of advisers in the policy decision process. Section 5 concludes.
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2. The Model
The model focuses on some speciﬁc features of the policy-making process in
order to examine how division of political tasks and specialized advisers affect
policyoutcomes. Themodeldescribesthebehavioroffouragents: twopolitical
agents and two advisers.
Let us ﬁrst introduce the political agents. The ﬁrst political agent is charged
with the responsibility of developing plans in a certain policy domain. This
agent is referred to as the spending minister, player S. The second political
agent is the ﬁnance minister, player F.
The model revolves around a certain project (X) which nature reveals to
player S. With respect to this project, there are two alternatives: the project is
undertaken (X D 1), or the status quo is maintained (X D 0). If the project is
undertaken, the payoffs to S and F are given by
5S.X D 1j²;¹/ D s C ² C ¹ (1)
and
5F.X D 1j²;¹/ D f C ² C ¹;withs > f; (2)
respectively. In Equations (1) and (2) the symbol s. f / denotes the extent to
which S(F) is biased toward undertaking the project. The spending minister’s
and the ﬁnance minister’s motives are not perfectly aligned. The spending
minister is evaluated on the basis of how well he does his specialized job. This
giveshimanincentivetopromotetheparochialinterestsofhisdepartment. The
ﬁnance minister cares about the policies in all policy areas. As a consequence,
his interests are broader than those of the individual spending minister. The
consequencesoftheprojectaresurroundedwithuncertainty. Thebeneﬁtsofthe
project,²,areuncertain,andsoaretheﬁnancialconsequences,¹. Both² and¹
are stochastic terms that are uniformly distributed over the interval [¡t, t]. The
political actors do not observe ² and ¹. By normalization, the payoffs to S and
F equal zero if the status quo is maintained, 5S.X D 0/ D 5F.X D 0/ D 0.
Throughout this article it is assumed that t > jsj and t > j f j. These
assumptionsensurethattherealizationsof² and¹determinewhetherornotthe
two political players beneﬁt from undertaking the project. As a consequence,
the political players have an incentive to gather information about ² and ¹.T o
minimize algebra, the payoff functions are kept as simple as possible. Three
assumptionsunderlyingEquations(1)and(2)arenotwithoutlossofgenerality.
First, the payoff function is linear, implying that the players are risk neutral, so
that information is not a “public good.” Accordingly, the political actors only
gather information about ² and ¹ to avoid a wrong decision (undertaking the
project if Equations (1) and (2) are negative or maintaining the status quo if
Equations (1) and (2) are positive). Second, the political actors evaluate the
uncertain consequences of the project in the same way. In the real world, the
evaluation of ² and ¹ may depend on p and s. Third, the properties of ² and ¹
are described by the same distribution function. Relaxing the second and third
restriction makes the model more general, but does not affect the spirit of the
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Let us now introduce the two other players. Both the spending minister and
the ﬁnance minister have the authority over a research staff. The research staff
of the spending minister, player AS, is specialized in assessing the beneﬁts of
the project, ². The research staff of the ﬁnance minister, player AF, consists
of experts on the ﬁnancial consequences of the project, and observes ¹. The
spending minister and the ﬁnance minister are laymen in the sense that they
do not observe ² and ¹, and are unable to communicate with their research
staffs about the exact values of the stochastic terms. The two research staffs
can only advise their clients to undertake the project or to maintain the status
quo. This means that the research staffs operate as policy advisers. Like
the two political players in the model, AS and AF are characterized by their
predispositions toward the project, as and af, respectively. Their payoffs are
given by
5AS.X D 1j²;¹/ D as C ² C ¹; (3)
5AF.X D 1j²;¹/ D af C ² C ¹; (4)
5AS.X D 0/ D 5AF.X D 0/ D 0: (5)
One of the main objectives of this article is to examine the characteristics
of advisers. Both the spending minister and the ﬁnance minister appoint the
advisers working for them. It is assumed that there exists a continuum of
applicants for the research jobs in terms of their predispositions (as and af)
toward the project. The parameters as and af are choice variables for the
spending minister and the ﬁnance minister, respectively.
Now that we have discussed the players in the model and their motives,
let us elaborate on the institutional environment in which the players operate.
The total policy space is partitioned into several policy jurisdictions. For each
jurisdiction a minister is charged with the responsibility to develop ideas about
projects. The selection of the projects to be undertaken takes place in two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁnance minister sets aside all projects which
are not supported by the advisers of the ministers (without research on their
ﬁnancial consequences). In the second stage, the ﬁnancial consequences of all
projects which have passed the ﬁrst round are assessed by the adviser of the
ﬁnance minister. The adviser informs the ﬁnance minister, who then decides
whether or not to veto the proposal.
The assumed institutional setting is admittedly an ad hoc one, although we
believe that it captures some features of reality. In principle, the institutional
setting implies that proposals for undertaking projects only survive if spending
ministers are able to make “a case.” In this respect, the position of the minister
resembles the position of a prosecutor who must have some evidence against a
suspecttostartatrial. Onereasonthattheﬁnanceministerdemandsthatprojects
shouldatleastbesupportedbytheresearchstaffofthespendingministeristhat
costs are attached to estimating the ﬁnancial consequences of projects. As we
willseelater, theexpectedbeneﬁtsfromresearchontheﬁnancialconsequences
of projects are higher when the projects are supported by the research staff ofA Theory of Policy Advice 607
Table 1. The Game Between a Spending Minister, the Finance Minister, and Their Advisers
Players
S, F, AS, and AF
Order of actions
(0) Nature chooses a project with ² and ¹; ² and ¹ are uniformly distributed on [¡t, t].
(1) S chooses as 2 .¡1;1/, AS observes ².
(2) AS sends message mAS 2f YAS;NASg,i fmAS D NAS the game ends, and X D 0.
(3) F chooses af2 .¡1;1/, AF observes ¹.
(4) AF sends message mAF 2f YAF;NAFg.
(5) F chooses X 2f 0;1g.
Payoffs
UI.X D 1j²;¹/ D i C ² C ¹, where I Df S, F, AS, AFg and i Df s;f;as;afg with t > s > f
UI.X D 0/ D 0.
the proposer. If the costs of doing research are moderately high, it is optimal
to set aside projects which are not supported by a research staff.
The model can be formalized as a dynamic game with asymmetric informa-
tion. Table 1 summarizes the game.
3. Equilibria
The game described in Table 1 has several perfect Bayesian equilibria. Nec-
essary conditions for these equilibria are that each player’s strategy is optimal
given the beliefs and strategies of the other players, and that the players’ be-
liefs are based on priors updated by Bayes’ rule. In this section we discuss the
equilibria of the game.
The game consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage S chooses an adviser AS,
who observes ². AS sends a message about the desirability of the project. In
the second stage, F appoints an adviser AF, who observes ¹. After AF has
sent a message, F makes a decision concerning the project. To ensure a time
consistent solution, we start by analyzing the second stage of the game.
By assumption, F and AF act only if mAS D YAS. When F makes a decision
concerning the project, he has received a message from AF. If AF has sent
mAF D YAF, then the expected payoff to F is equal to
E[5F.X D 1jmAS D YAS ^ mAF D YAF/] D f C E.²jmAS D YAS/
C E.¹jmAF D YAF/: (6)
If AP has sent mAF D NAF, the expected payoff to F is equal to
E[5F.X D 1jmAS D YAS ^ mAF D YAF/] D f C E.²jmAS D YAS/
C E.¹jmAF D NAF/: (7)
On the basis of Equations (6) and (7), three cases can be distinguished. First,
bothEquations(6)and(7)arenegative. InthiscaseitisoptimalforFtochoose
X D 0, irrespective of the message sent by AF. Second, both Equations (6) and
(7) are positive, so that F should always choose X D 1. Finally, Equation (6) is608 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V15 N3
positive and Equation (7) is negative.2 In this case it is optimal for F to choose
X D 1i fmAF D YAF and to choose X D 0i fmAF D NAF.
Now consider the problem AF faces. Adviser AF beneﬁts from the project
if
af C E.²jmAS D YAS/ C ¹>0: (8)
Suppose that F chooses X D 1i fmAF D YAF and X D 0i fmAF D NAF. Then
the optimal response of AF is to send mAF D YAF if Equation (8) holds, and to
send mAF D NAF otherwise. Bayes’ rule implies
E.¹jmAF D YAF/ D 1=2[t ¡ af ¡ E.²jmAS D YAS/] (9)
E.¹jmAF D NAF/ D¡ 1=2[t C af C E.²jmAS D YAS/]: (10)
Clearly if Equations (9) and (10) imply that Equation (6) is positive and Equa-
tion (7) is negative, then the strategies of F and AF are optimal responses to
eachother. Thesestrategiesformapartiallypoolingorinformativeequilibrium
in which the message sent by AF contains information about ¹ and induces F’s
action (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989). If Equations (9) and (10) imply that Equa-
tions (6) and (7) have the same sign, then only pooling equilibria exist: the
message sent by AF does not affect F’s decision concerning the project.
ItshouldbepointedoutthatapoolingequilibriumalsoexistsifEquations(9)
and (10) imply that Equations (6) and (7) have opposite signs. In this case a
poolingequilibriumrequiresthatFalwaysignoresAF’smessage,andthatAF’s
message is independent of the realization of ¹ (for example, AF always sends
mAF D YAF). Thesestrategiesimplythattheposteriorbeliefabout¹isequalto
the prior belief: E.¹/ D E.¹jmAF D YAF/ D E.¹jmAF D NAF/ D 0. Clearly,
giventheseposteriorbeliefs,thepositedstrategiesareoptimalresponsestoeach
other. However,thepoolingequilibriumisnotstable. Ifthereisaninﬁnitesimal
probability that F does not ignore AF’s message, AF has an incentive to send
mAF D YAF if Equation (8) holds, and mAF D NAF otherwise. But then it
is optimal for F to follow his adviser’s message, so that a partially pooling
equilibrium occurs. Hence, if a partially pooling equilibrium exists, a pooling
equilibrium is not stable and unlikely to occur.
With partially pooling strategies, the expected payoff to F is equal to the
probability that AF sends mAF D YAF multiplied by Equation (6). Using
Equation (9), we obtain
E.5FjmAS D YAS/




[t C apC E.²jmAS D YAS/][p C 1=2E.²jmAS D YAS/
C 1=2.t ¡ ap/]: (11)
2. We ignore semantic problems. Thus we do not consider the case that Equation (6) is negative
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Fshouldappointanadviserwhosepredisposition,af,maximizesEquation(11).
It is easy to show that af D f maximizes Equation (11).
Using af D f , and Equations (6), (7), (9), and (10), it is straightforward to
derive the conditions for a partially pooling equilibrium:
f C t C E.²jmAS D YAS/>0 (12)
and
f ¡ t C E.²jmAS D YAS/<0: (13)
Since by assumption t > j f j, and E.²jmAS D YAS/ ¸ 0, Equation (12) always
holds. It is easy to see that if the above conditions are violated, information
about ¹ will never induce F to change his decision concerning the project. The
reason is that even if ¹ were highly unfavorable (favorable), F would beneﬁt
(suffer) from undertaking the project. To put it differently, if Equation (12) or
Equation (13) is violated, information about the project is not useful (cf. Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998:6). In contrast, if Equations (12) and (13) are satisﬁed,
information about ¹ helps F to avoid a wrong decision. Then the only stable
equilibrium in the second stage of the game is a partially pooling one. In this
partially pooling equilibrium, F confronts AF with exactly the same decision
problem he himself would face if he had observed ¹. As a consequence, AF
makes the same decision concerning the project as F would make if he had
observed ¹. This means that communication between F and AF is perfect (cf.
Calvert, 1985; Lupia and McCubbins, 1994, 1998).
Let us now analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game. All players acting in the ﬁrst
stage of the game anticipate the strategies players will follow in the second
stage. Suppose that in the second stage of the game pooling strategies are
followed [Equation (13) is violated, so that mAS D YAS induces F to choose
X D 1]. It is straightforward to show that under those circumstances it is
optimal for S to choose as D s, and it is optimal for AS to send mAS D YAS if
²>¡as, and to send mAS D NAS otherwise. However, given these strategies
and the assumption that j f j < jsj < t, the posterior beliefs about ² imply that
Equation (13) is satisﬁed. Hence, if information about the consequences of
the project is relevant for F, there does not exist an equilibrium of the game in
which in the second-stage pooling strategies are followed.
Now suppose that in the second stage of the game communication occurs
between F and AF. By assumption the game ends if mAS D NAS. As a conse-
quence, AS will send mAS D YAS if he expects to beneﬁt from the project, and
mAS D NAS if he expects to lose from the project. If AS sends mAS D YAS,
the decision concerning the project depends on the message sent by AF. Antic-
ipating that F chooses X D 1 if AF sends mAF D YAF, and X D 0 if AF sends
mAF D NAF, AS expects to beneﬁt from the project if
²>¡as ¡ E.¹jmAF D YAF/: (14)
Thus AS sends mAS D YAS if Equation (12) holds, and mAS D NAS otherwise.
Note that although AS has no information about the realization of ¹, its action
is based on the assumption that AF advises F to undertake the project. One610 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V15 N3
interpretation of this is that AS assumes that the ﬁnancial consequences of the
project are favorable. This does not imply that AS takes an overly optimistic
view of the ﬁnancial consequences of the project. Rather it shows that AS
anticipates that for unfavorable political consequences, AF sends mAF D NAF,
which induces F to reject the project.
After substitution of Equation (7) into Equation (14), Bayes’ rule implies












E.²jmAS D NAS/ D
1
3
. f ¡ 2t ¡ 2as/: (15)
Finally,considertheproblemSfacesconcerningthechoiceofas. Thestrategies
oftheotherplayerswhoactafterSimplythattheprojectwillonlybeundertaken
if both AF and AS advise that the project should be undertaken. At the time
player S chooses as, the expected payoff to S is equal to the probability that AS
sends mAS D YAS multiplied with the probability that AF sends mAF D YAF,
multiplied by the payoff to S conditional on these messages and given that the
project is undertaken. Hence, when choosing as, the expected payoff to S is
given by
E.5S/ D Pr.mAS D YAS/Pr.mAF D YAF/[s C E.²jmAS D YAS/
C E.¹jmAF/ D YAF/] D
1
3t
.2t C 2as ¡ f /
1
3t














Equation (16) gives the expected payoff to S as a third-order function of as.
Clearly the payoff to S equals zero if Pr.mAS D YAS/ and Pr.mAF D YAF/ are
nonpositive. Forthisreasonas mustlieintheinterval.1=2p¡t;2tC2 f /.I ti s
easy to show that the extreme in this interval is a local maximum. The optimal
value of as is that value of as which maximizes Equation (16). Differentiating
Equation (16) with respect to as yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
2as2 C Qas C Z D 0; where
Q D¡ 4s ¡ 4t ¡ 2 f and Z D 2st C 5sf C 2tf ¡ f 2: (17)
Solving Equation (17) for as, with as 2 .1=2 f ¡ t;2t C 2 f / yields





s2 C t2 C
3
4





there remains to show that Equation (13) is satisﬁed. Equation (13) requires
thatas > 2 f ¡t. InAppendixAitisprovedthatEquation(18)impliesthatthis
inequalityisalwayssatisﬁed. Hencethederivedstrategiesandimpliedposterior
beliefs form a stable perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game presented in
Table 1. This game also has pooling equilibria, but these are not stable.A Theory of Policy Advice 611
Let us summarize our results. The game discussed in the previous section
has a unique stable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, F appoints an adviser
whose predisposition coincides with that of himself. Player S appoints an
adviser whose predisposition differs from that of himself. The project is un-
dertaken if and only if both advisers send a positive message. The uniqueness
of the equilibrium depends on the assumption that without information about
² and ¹ player F may make a wrong decision concerning the project. Only in
the case that information about ² and ¹ is irrelevant for F, there exist stable
noninformative equilibria.
4. The Role of Advisers in the Policy Decision Process
The analysis suggests that advisers play an important role in the ﬁnal decision
concerning public projects. In our model only if both advisers agree that a pub-
lic project should be undertaken, the ﬁnance minister will not veto it. Judged
by appearances, the policy decision process is dominated by the advisers, for
their recommendations are decisive. However, appearances are deceptive. By
appointing advisers, and hence choosing the predispositions of their advisers,
the spending minister and the ﬁnance minister shape the behavior of their ad-
visers. The ﬁnance minister appoints an adviser whose predisposition toward
the project coincides with that of himself. As discussed in the previous section,
by doing so the adviser takes the same decision the ﬁnance minister would
make if he had observed the ﬁnancial consequences of the project. However,
Equation (18) implies that the spending minister does not appoint an adviser
whose attitude toward the project conforms with that of himself. Because of
this, the advice of AS may deviate from the advice S would have given if he
were the adviser himself. To answer why, we examine how in an informative
equilibrium as is related to f and s. In Appendix B the following proposition
is proved:
Proposition 1. Equation (1) implies: s > as > f .
Proposition 1 states that the adviser of the spending minister is less biased
toward undertaking the project than the spending minister, and more biased
towardundertakingtheprojectthantheﬁnanceminister(andhisadviser). What
is the intuition behind this result? In our model the spending minister consults
an expert for two reasons. First, like the ﬁnance minister, the spending minister
wantstoknowwhetherhewillbeneﬁtfromundertakingtheproject. Ifthiswere
the only reason for consulting an expert, the spending minister would appoint
an adviser characterized by as D s. A positive message from such an adviser
impliesthatthespendingminister’sexpectedbeneﬁtsfromtheprojectarehigher
than zero, and a negative message implies that the expected beneﬁts from the
projectarelowerthanzero. Second, thespendingministerconsultsanexpertto
convince the ﬁnance minister (and his adviser) of the desirability of the project.
The less the adviser of the spending minister is biased toward the project, the
more the ﬁnance minister is convinced of the desirability of the project (if the
advisersendsmAS D YAS). Infact,themostpersuasiveadviseristheonewhose
predisposition toward the project is equal to that of the ﬁnance minister.612 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V15 N3
The two reasons for consulting an expert are that in appointing an adviser,
the spending minister faces a trade-off between acquiring information and pro-
viding information. Acquiring information requires that as is close to s,b u t
providing information requires that as is close to f . Clearly the distinction
between acquiring and providing information vanishes if the preferences of the
spending minister and the ﬁnance minister are perfectly aligned: if s D f ,
Equation (16) implies that as D f .
5. Conclusions
In this article we have employed a game-theoretical model to examine how
division of tasks in advising the government affect policy outcomes. Two
features of our model pertain to division of tasks. First, policy decisions are
madeintwostages. Intheﬁrststage, aspendingministerhastomakeacasefor
a project, and in the second stage the ﬁnance minister can veto a proposal for
the project. Second, in our model, policy has two types of consequences. Both
the spending minister and the ﬁnance minster can consult an adviser to obtain
information about one type of policy consequence. Advisers are specialists.
They only observe one type of consequence of a policy proposal.
Our model shows that the spending minister and the ﬁnance minister face
different constraints when selecting an adviser. The chooser wants to obtain
information about the consequences of policies. This gives him an incentive
to consult an adviser whose predisposition toward policies coincides with that
of himself. The spending minister wants the ﬁnance minister to support his
proposal. This means that the proposer consults an adviser not only to obtain
information about the consequences of the project, but also to provide infor-
mation about the consequences of his proposal. This gives the proposer an
incentive to choose an adviser whose predisposition toward the project lies
between the predisposition of himself and that of the chooser.
Appendix A
We have to prove
as > 2 f ¡ t: (A.1)
Equation (17) implies that Equation (A.1) requires
V D 2.2 f ¡t/2¡.4sC4tC2 f /.2 f ¡t/C2stC5sfC2tf¡ f 2 > 0: (A.2)
Rearranging Equation (A.2) yields
V D 6t.t ¡ f / C .6t ¡ 3 f /.s ¡ f /: (A.3)
Since by assumption t > f and s > f;V > 0.
Appendix B
We have to prove
as < s (B.1)
as > f: (B.2)A Theory of Policy Advice 613
First consider Equation (B.1). Equation (17) implies that Equation (B.1) re-
quires that
V D 2s2 ¡ .4s C 4t C 2 f /s C 2st C 5sf C 2tf ¡ f 2: (B.3)
After some rearrangements Equation (B.3) can be rewritten as
V D 2t. f ¡ t/ C s. f ¡ s/ ¡ .s ¡ f /2; so that
V D 2t. f ¡ s C s ¡ t/ C s. f ¡ s/ ¡ .s ¡ f /2; implying
V D .2t C s/. f ¡ s/ C 2t.s ¡ t/ ¡ .s ¡ f /2: (B.4)
Because by assumption f < s and jsj < t, V is negative. Next consider
Equation (B.2). Equation (15) implies that Equation (B.2) requires that
V D 2 f 2 ¡ .4s C 4t C 2 f / f C 2st C 5sf C 2tf ¡ f 2 > 0: (B.5)
Equation (B.5) can be written as
V D .2t C f /.s ¡ f /: (B.6)
Since j f j < t and s > f , V is positive.
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